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Introduction
The English jury has recently been undergoing various alterations.
These changes have their roots in assumptions, often not clearly iden-
tified, about the nature and purpose of the jury within the criminal jus-
tice system. Once the purpose and ideals of the jury system are iden-
tified, and there may be arguments about what they are,' it becomes
apparent that there may be a conflict about how they should be put
into practice. The state and its agencies may take one view whilst
others may differ. An example of one such conflict is the controversy
over the newly discovered practice of 'jury vetting'.
The discovery of jury vetting
In October 1978, the Attorney General disclosed that since 1975 checks
had been made (as authorised by the Director of Public Prosecutions)
on the records of potential jurors in 25 'important and exceptional
trials' 2. This statement was in response to criticism of the screening of
potential jurors in the initial trial of two journalists and a former sol-
dier, under the Official Secrets Act.
The Attorney General stated that prior to 1974 the practice 'had
grown up' at the Central Criminal Courts of prosecutors asking police
for 'certain information' onjurors in 'certain cases'. This was done only
in a 'small number of important cases directed to producing an
unbiased jury not likely to be subject to outside pressures'3 . The prose-
cution would deal with undesirable jurors by asking them to stand
aside for the crown. The Attorney General likened this to the exercise
by the defence of its right to peremptory challenge4 .
The statement declared that this practice had come to the Govern-
ment's attention following a trial of IRA activists in 1974. The then
Home Secretary and the DPP with the Attorney General, reviewed the
practice and decided that it should continue only subject to 'guide-
1. For a discussion of this point see G. Marshall 'The Judgement of One's Peers' in The
British Juy System, Cropwood Conference (Institute of Criminology, Cambridge, 1975)
pp. 1-9 and P. Duff and M. Findlay 'The Jury in England: Practice and Ideology' (1982)
10 IJSL pp. 253-265.
2. The types of trial were - Terrorists (IRA) 12, Official Secrets 2, Murder 4, Armed
Robbery 5, International Fraud 2. See New Society, 19 October 1978, p. 127.
3. The Times, 11 October 1978.
4. At present the accused has three. S. 43 Criminal Law Act 1977.
Published in Legal Studies, 1983 July, Vol. 3, Issue 2, pp. 159-173.
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lines'". These were brought to the attention of all police forces, but not
made public, and comprised the following:
1. Two principles were to be generally observed:
(i) the random selection of the jury from the panel,
(ii) prospective jurors were only to be disqualified in terms of the
Juries Act 1974.
2. Parliament has provided safeguards against corrupt or biased
jurors by introducing the possibility of majority verdicts.
3. There are certain exceptional cases 'where these safeguards may
not be sufficient to ensure the proper administration of justice and
where the principles set out in paragraph 1 may properly be departed
from in the interests both ofjustice and of the public'.
4. These classes of case cannot be defined but 'broadly speaking'
they include:
(a) serious offences with strong political motives (e.g. terrorist or
Official Secrets Act prosecutions);
(b) serious offences perpetrated by gangs of 'professional crimi-
nals'6 .
5. A juror may be susceptible to pressure or have 'extreme political
beliefs' and therefore be biased. In cases involving the Official Secrets
Act some evidence may be heard in camera and a juror may make
improper use of such information.
6. To decide whether these 'factors might seriously influence a
potential juror's impartial performance' it may be proper practice to




(c) local CID files.
No enquiries beyond a check of police records should be made.
7. To carry out such an investigation it would be necessary to have
the personal authority of the DPP or his deputy, who should notify the
Attorney General.
8. No right of stand by should be exercised because of certain infor-
mation, unless there is strong reason to believe that a juror might be
unfairly influenced or biased.
9. Where a juror is asked to stand by for the Crown, there is no duty
on the prosecution to disclose to the defence the information on which
the request was based.
10. If it turns out that a juror might be biased against the accused,
the defence should be given an indication of why that potential juror
may be detrimental to their interests. 'The principle of equality of
information should be observed, wherever possible'.
5. These guidelines and the Attorney General's statement were published in The Times,
11 October 1978.
6. It is interesting to note that fear of pressure from 'professional criminals' was one of
the central supports in the argument of those in Parliament who successfully promoted
the introduction of the majority verdict in England and Wales.
Jury vetting 161
As is obvious, the scope of these guidelines is very broad and discre-
tionary.
In August 1980, the newly appointed Attorney General, Sir Michael
Havers, reviewed the existing guidelines on jury vetting7 . He recognised
that with the existence of the majority verdict and the specific provisions
under the Juries Act for the disqualification of certain classes of persons,
Parliament had provided safeguards against corrupt or biasedjurors. In
addition, he envisaged, as did his predecessor, that criminal record
checks by the police might be necessary 'as part of their usual function of
preventing the commission of offences', (i.e. sitting on ajury while dis-
qualified). Further, it might be necessary to supplement the normal safe-
guards in 'certain exceptional types of case of public importance' where
there was a 'possibility of bias', and go beyond the checking of criminal
records. These exceptional cases would broadly be those-involving issues
of national security and terrorist cases. The extra precautions would be
necessary because of the danger that a 'juror's political beliefs are so
biased as to go beyond normally reflecting the broad spectrum of views
and interests in the community ... to a degree which might interfere
with his fair assessment of the facts of the case or lead him to exert
improper pressure on his fellow jurors'.
The additional information on jurors should be sought from Special
Branch, but beyond that check no further steps should be taken. The
Special Branch records should not be checked without the DPP having
applied to the Attorney General for his personal authority. No right of
standby should be exercised unless the information affords a strong
reason to believe there is a risk of bias or a security problem.
An addition to the earlier guidelines is that the Attorney General
should keep records of all incidents of 'vetting' for monitoring purposes.
Jury vetting under attack
Following the Attorney General's disclosure in 1978 of the existence of
jury vetting a great deal of publicity was given to this topic. At this time
the original trial under the Official Secrets Act, at which the use of the
practice had emerged, was still in progress. Shortly afterwards there fol-
lowed a trial of anarchists on charges of conspiracy to rob and illegal
possession of firearms and explosives. The trial was before judge King-
Hamilton and again vetting of the jury took place8 .
There was some disquiet about the fact that the guidelines had been
drawn up in 1975,jury vetting had taken place, and yet its operation had
remained more or less secret. Considerable opposition to the practice
was expressed, notably by the National Council for Civil Liberties and
E. P. Thompson the social historian. Support for the practice was also
forthcoming.
Criticisms ofjury vetting appear to have been launched on two separate
levels; what we might call the practical level and the ideological level.
7. The Times, 2 August 1980.
8. See M. Kettle 'Note on Jury Vetting' New Society, 27 September 1979.
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Practical arguments
The practical argument is directed against the possibility of properly
regulating and monitoring the practice ofjury vetting. There has also
been more general criticism of the manner in which the practice has
evolved.
E. P. Thompson 9 attacked jury vetting as a practice which originated
in the prosecutions camp and was fostered secretly with the assistance
of the police to a point where the Attorney General accepted it as the
natural state of affairs. After this practice 'came to light' the Govern-
ment accepted its continuance 'in the interests ofjustice' and 'moved to
establish firm safeguards"' .
'Guidelines' were 'set out' and 'brought to the attention' of the
police. Thompson continued rhetorically asking the Attorney General:
'... What is a guideline? Is it a rule of law or is it a nudge-nudge-be-
careful-how-you-go? What officers have you appointed to see that these
guidelines are observed. What sanctions have you imposed against
transgression? How are we to know if a case be of an 'exceptional type'
or not? What rule at law may hang upon the phrase (as appears in the
latest guidelines) "it is impossible to define precisely" the cases to
which it might refer? If law is now to rest on such nice terms as
"broadly speaking", who is to speak or how broad may that speech
be.'
The weakness of the guidelines approach was well evidenced by the
subsequent disclosure of the practice of the Northamptonshire Consta-
bulary. In a letter disclosed by the recipient the prosecuting solicitor of
Northamptonshire revealed that all potential jurors were scrutinised to
ensure that they had no legal disqualifications. However, the letter
went on:
'If it should appear from such scrutiny that the character and antece-
dents of any prospective juror is (sic) such that it makes it undesirable
for a prospective juror to sit generally or in a more particular case, this
information is supplied to prosecuting counsel." 2
So much for the Attorney General's guidelines! Some days later the
Attorney General expressed his disapproval of the Northamptonshire
practice and reiterated that there was not supposed to be anyjury vetting
without the Attorney General's permission or outside his guidelines 3 .
Early the following month the Home Secretary announced that he had
written to the Chief Constable of Northamptonshire seeking assurances
that his police would conform to the guidelines relating to checks onjury
panels. The Chief Constable confirmed that they would so conform.
9. E. Thompson 'The State versus its "Enemies"' New Society, 19 October 1978.
10. The quoted terminology emanates either from the Attorney General's statement or
from circulars from the DPP.
11. Op. dt.
12. The Times, 22 February 1980.
13. The Times, 26 February 1980.
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However, the two disturbing features of this example are first that this
general checking practice had gone on for so long, in spite of the issue of
guidelines over five years before and the general publicity which they
had so recently received, and second that the Attorney General had no
power beyond the good offices of the Home Secretary to require compli-
ance with his guidelines. The Attorney General not only was ignorant of
the abuse prior to the disclosure of the letter, but still remains unable
actually to monitorjury vetting practice throughout police forces in Eng-
land and Wales or to ensure compliance with the guidelines.
The NCCL called for legislation to enforce the Attorney General's
guidelines because they had no confidence that they would be followed 4 .
They pointed out that without any sanction for their breach the guide-
lines were unenforceable. This fear was borne out when the lack of legal
standing of the guidelines was made very clear in R v Mason5 which we
will turn to shortly.
Concern has also been expressed about the type of information relat-
ing tojurors which might come to light through the vetting process. How
will their privacy be affected?
For example in the anarchists' trial 93 potential jurors were vetted
within the guidelines because the accused were acting from political
motives. Criminal records, local CID files and Special Branch records
were consulted and the defence were furnished with the information aris-
ing out of the first two sources alone. This is odd and rather unfair
because the reason for vetting was in case any potential jurors had
extreme political beliefs, so the defence was being denied the most
important information. Nevertheless, information disclosed to the
defence referred to a woman who had been a victim of a crime, people
whose children had been prosecuted, and a person whose address was
believed to be a 'squat'. This accumulation of irrelevant data caused
16some concern
The NCCL point out that the privacy of the jurors may be in danger
from the defence also. Private detectives could be used to vet the jury
panel. In R v Sheffield Crown Court, exp Brownlow"7 which we will examine
later, it was the defence which requested the vetting process.
Ideological arguments
Not only are the mechanics by which jury vetting operates open to
attack, but the premises upon which it is based are illogical and
unsound. They are inconsistent with the ideals of the jury and its func-
tion in the criminal justice system. Vetting undermines some of the cen-
tral pillars on which public confidence in the jury rests. These central
pillars are thejury's independence, impartiality and representativeness,
obtained through the use ofrandom lay participation. On occasion these
14. The Times, 11 March 1980.
15. [1980] 3 WLR 617.
16. Kettle op. cit.
17. [1980] 2 WLR 892.
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aims may come into conflict and historically they may have altered but
that is not our concern here 8 .
Independence is seen as important because it enables the jury to
reach a fair, just and impartial verdict. It is argued that the judge might
be seen to be too closely involved with the state, the legal system and
the police, always to be totally impartial. He might be thought to be
accountable to politicians which would render his judgement suspect in
cases with political overtones. Additionally, he might be seen unthink-
ingly to represent his class interests.
The jury suffers from none of these disadvantages. The jury gives its
verdict with complete impunity. It is not accountable to anyone.
Futhermore it is seen as representing the community interest. Addi-
tionally it gives no reasons for its decisions so its reasoning process can-
not be attacked. The particular merits of each case can be taken into
account regardless of the strict letter of the law'9 .
Following from this is the idea that the jury will refuse to enforce
repugnant laws. It will not convict where the facts point clearly in that
direction if the law is oppressive or the punishment disproportionate to
the offence. Thus the jury is seen as the 'bulwark of liberty'. Lord Dev-
lin says of the jury:
'... no tyrant could afford to leave a subject's freedom in the hands of
twelve of his countrymen ... it is the lamp that shows that freedom
lives.' 2
0
There is some historical evidence for these claims, although they may
be exaggerated on occasion21.
In short the jury is seen as an institution which in the last resort will
act as a defender of the liberty of the people. If the state encroaches too
far on the freedom of the individual the jury, representing the country,
will resist. The independence and impartiality of the jury guarantee
that it can exercise this function if necessary. In order for the jury to be
independent and impartial, it is felt that it should be representative of
the community at large. In this way bias or influence brought into the
jury room by any one of the jurors will be countered, and the fusion of
all the jurors' opinions and prejudices will create a neutral disinteres-
ted whole.
The sine qua non of representativeness is seen as being random selec-
tion from the community22. Any positive selection procedure will tilt
the balance of the jury away from the 'community conscience' in a
direction dependent on the criteria used for selection. It was the desire
for a more truly representative jury which led to the abolition of the
property qualification in the Criminal Justice Act 1972, following the
18. See G. Marshall op. cit.; P. Duff and M. Findlay op. cit.
19. See H. Kalven and H. Zeisel The American Jugy (Little, Brown & Co, Boston, 1966).
20. P. Devlin Trial byJugy (Stevens, London, 1966) p. 164.
21. For an account of the jury's role as 'the bulwark of liberty' see W. Cornish TheJugy
(Allen Lane, London, 1968) Ch. 5.
22. This is distorted to an extent by each accused's three peremptory challenges and the
exemptions and disqualifications under the Juries Act 1974.
Jury vetting 165.
recommendation of the Morris Committee in 196523. Without this
reform the legitimacy of the jury would have been open to question in
an increasingly egalitarian society. A jury consisting mainly of male,
middle class householders might no longer have been seen as fulfilling
the aim of impartiality.
Its proponents argue that jury vetting is necessary top reserve these
virtues of independence, impartially and representativeness. Yet this
argument does not stand up to close scrutiny.
It is worth making a preliminary point. If the state is so concerned
that a partial juror may 'exert improper pressures on his fellow
jurors'2 , this shows little faith in the jurors' powers of independent
reason and ability to do their job. What is the point of having juries at
all, if the combined reason of the majority ofjurors, judge and counsel
cannot prevail over the influence of the biased few?
More telling, however, if two jurors in England are biased or intract-
able, this situation is overcome by the acceptability of a 10/2 majority
verdict. It is only when three or more jurors are 'biased' or hold
6extreme political views' that their prejudice may have an effect on the
verdict. Yet would it not be difficult to dismiss the view of at least 25
per cent of any randomly selected group from the community at large
as biased? How could the representatives of one quarter of the popula-
tion be an 'extremist minority'? Is it not a central aspect of the jury sys-
tem that the whole populace have a voice in the trial of their peers?
Does that not entail a truthful verdict being distilled from many differ-
ent minds? If the state gradually excludes large groups of the popula-
tion, this aspect is destroyed.
Additionally the value of thejury as a possible defender of the people's
liberty against the all-powerful state is lessened, if not lost altogether. If
the state is able to choose the members ofthejury the independence of the
jury is lost. It is precisely in 'political' cases that the state wants to do this.
Obviously jurors likely to hold against the state will be excluded. By
handpicking suitable jurors the state can secure the result it desires, a
conviction, no matter how oppressive the law is or misguided the prosecu-
tion may be. Thejury ceases to be 'the lamp that shows freedom lives'.
In short, is it not illogical to suggest that by restricting and control-
ling the selection procedure a more impartial and independent jury is
the result?
In relation to the trial of the anarchists Judge King-Hamilton
expressed approval ofjury vetting in the following terms:
'One has heard of criticism of "jury vetting" as amounting to the aban-
donment of random selection ofjuries. What nonsense! It widens the
random selection instead of being limited to the first 12 ."z
Such manifest illogicality hardly requires comment. Suffice it to say,
that to select the twelve jurors you want, from the whole panel, does
23. Cmnd. 2627 (HMSO, London, 1965).
24. Sir Michael Havers justifying vetting; The Times, 2 August 1980.
25. The Times, 7 December 1979.
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not widen random selection. It does precisely the opposite!
The key question in weeding out 'partial' or 'biased' jurors is how
and by whom impartiality is determined. The logical conclusion may
be that anyone who disagrees with the state is ipsofacto so partial and
biased as to be unsuitable for jury service. In other words the danger is
that impartiality comes to be determined by the agencies of the state. It
then may mean agreement with the state.
Examples of this type of thinking emerged in a television debate,
some three months after the anarchists trial. Judge King-Hamilton
expanded his views on what type ofjuror would best be 'objective and
impartial'. He should be over 25 years of age because:
'Young people - particularly students are inclined to be rebellious and
mutinous ... if they are on a jury, one way of demonstrating it is by
returning a verdict against the establishment, that is a verdict of not
guilty, no matter how strong the evidence, the other way.'
26
Lord Denning, perhaps surprisingly after his statements in Brown-
low 7, now thinks that the jury selection procedure should be refined to
ensure that a jury is composed of only 'sensible and responsible mem-
bers of the community' 28 . The problem, of course, is who is to be
deemed 'sensible and responsible' and by whom.
The recommendations of the Association of Chief Police Officers are
enlightening as well. They wanted checking of criminal records of
jurors done where there was any reason to suspect a potential juror was
disqualified, or that in a previous abortive trial there had been an
attempt to interfere with jurors or in any other cases where it was
'important' that no disqualified juror was involved. These checks
might be made without applying for the Attorney General's authority.
However, more controversially, the broadest proposal was that when
information is obtained that does not disqualify ajuror, but makes him
'unsuitable', the police or the DPP may pass it to prosecution counsel2 9.
In the television debate withJudge King-Hamilton, the Chief Const-
able of Kent spoke in favour of vetting saying:
'There is no means of ensuring that the defendant will get an objective
and impartial trial ... we have got to do something to stop criminals
having their own way. One of the areas where they can be stopped is by
having objective and impartial juries.'3 °
There is of course the traditional means of ensuring an objective and
impartial jury, namely random selection from the panel. However it
seems that this is no longer enough, and the further step of dispensing
with 'unsuitable' jurors needs to be taken.
Thus proponents of jury vetting believe it ensures 'objective' and
'impartial' juries. The problem is that not everyone would accept the
26. Reported in The Times, 15 March 1980.
27. See post.
28. Lord Denning What Next in the Law? (Butterworths, London, 1982) p. 77.
29. The Times, 2 September 1980.
30. The Times, 15 March 1980.
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notions of objectivity and impartiality as being accurately or properly
defined by Judge King-Hamilton or Lord Denning or the Chief Const-
able or for that matter any agency of the state.
Recent decisions
Following the controversy raised by the Official Secrets trial, the publi-
cation of the guidelines and the anarchists trial, two cases, the subject
matter of which was jury vetting, came to the Court of Appeal.
1. Brownlow
In R v Sheffield Crown Court, ex p Brownlow31, the court considered to
what, if any, extent jury vetting could be generally countenanced. This
case involved two police officers, charged with assault, who applied at
their trial for a direction from the judge to the prosecution, to inform
their counsel whether any members of the jury panel had any criminal
convictions. In this case it was the defence which desired the vetting.
The judge ordered the Chief Constable of South Yorkshire to furnish
the defence and the prosecution with full details of any criminal convic-
tions recorded against any member of the jury panel. The Chief Const-
able in turn applied for an order of certiorari to quash the judge's order.
The application was dismissed because the Divisional Court held that
it had no jurisdiction in the matter and the Chief Constable appealed.
The case turned on an issue of statutory interpretation 32, and the
court (Lord Denning dissenting) followed the Divisional Court in hold-
ing that it had no jurisdiction to consider the original order of the trial
judge.
However, because the trial judge asked for some guidance on a mat-
ter of public concern both Shaw LJ and Lord Denning commented at
length, obiter dicta, on the practice ofjury vetting.
Lord Denning outlined two rival philosophies ofjury selection. One
says that parties to a dispute ought to know all about the jurors to
ensure their suitability to try the case. That philosphy prevails in the
USA. The other is that the jury is selected randomly, in order to repre-
sent a cross-section of the people, and the parties to the dispute must
take the jurors as they come. This prevails in England. So well estab-
lished is the principle of random selection in England that Lord Den-
ning could not recall in his career a single 'challenge' or 'stand by' for
the Crown. Additionally he pointed out that Lord Devlin in Trial by
Jury (1956) stated that the Crown's right of challenge is obsolescent.
Lord Denning went on to outline the recent disclosures of jury vet-
ting and expressed his own view that the practice was 'unconstitu-
tional' 33. He indicated that he was concerned about the privacy of
jurors and pointed out that in the event of an unsuitable juror sitting,
the likelihood of his influencing the result is minimal, particularly now
31. Supra n. 17.
32. Re the Courts Act 1971, s. 10(l), (5).
33. Op. dit. p  900.
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when there is a majority verdict. This latter practical critisism is par-
ticularly interesting coming from such a strong opponent of the intro-
duction of the majority verdict.
Shaw LJ started by stating his agreement with Lord Denning:
'that any order or direction of a court designed to facilitate the selection
of a jury by methods not directly provided for in the Juries Act 1974 or
recognised by the common law is unconstitutional'34.
He thought that if the prosecution used the knowledge about jurors
available to it this would be 'contrary to the spirit and principle ofjury
service'3 . He did envisage 'very special cases' where in the public inter-
est such knowledge ought to be used, but only with the sanction of the
Attorney General. However it would be impermissible to allow jury
vetting merely because it might strengthen a prosecution by excluding
from a jury someone who might be well disposed to criminals or anti-
authority.
Shaw LJ was also worried about the privacy of thejurors and the fact
that enquiries might 'harass or intimidate' them, which would prevent
them discharging their function 'fearlessly and impartially'.
The only comment Brandon LJ made was:
'I have serious doubt whether there should be any jury vetting at all,
either by the prosecution or the defence'
36
Therefore Lord Denning certainly, and perhaps Brandon LJ, rejec-
ted the concept ofjury vetting outright. Shaw LJ, while disapproving
generally of the practice, left the door open to its use in 'very special
cases'. The arguments used by the judges were primarily on the
'ideological' level, although some concern was expressed on the 'practi-
cal' ground of the danger to jurors' privacy. Lord Denning was worried
that, if vetting was allowed in a case involving a minor assault charge,
then jury vetting would be permissible in every case. 'We shall have
"jury vetting" introduced into this country beyond recall unless parlia-
ment in two or three years takes a hand'37.
2. Mason
Only two months after Brownlow, a different bench of the Court of
Appeal expressed some remarkably different views concerning jury vet-
ting. In R v Mason38 the court was faced with a situation where, before
the applicant's trial, the police had checked the local criminal records
and, unknown to the defence, they had supplied counsel for the prosec-
tuion with the names of those called forjury service who had been con-
victed of criminal offences. This had occurred in Northampton before
34. Op. cit. p. 902.
35. Op. dit. p. 903.
36. Op. di. p. 904.
37. Op. cit. p. 895.
38. Supra, n. 15.
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the routine use of vetting had come to light and the Chief Constable
had agreed to stop these checks.
When the jury were being empanelled, counsel had asked four mem-
bers of the panel to stand by for the Crown. The applicant sought leave
to appeal against conviction on the ground that this was a material
irregularity in the course of the trial. In this instance the issue as
regards jury vetting was more specific than that canvassed in Brown-
low's case. Disregarding the opinion of the court in that case, the court
in Mason refused the application for leave to appeal and did not criticise
this instance ofjury vetting.
Counsel for the applicant submitted that the information supplied by
the police to prosecuting counsel could only be used in certain circum-
stances. He argued that a standby could only be requested on the basis
of such information where it seemed likely that cause could be shown.
To show cause it would be necessary to satisfy the court that the poten-
tial juror was in fact biased. The fact of a previous conviction by itself
does not prove bias. Additionally, counsel submitted that the Juries
Act 1974 should be construed as envisaging that everyone qualified to
serve as a juror should be allowed to do so unless specifically dis-
qualified, excused or rendered ineligible under Schedule 1 of the Act.
The court rejected the latter argument, which was one that the court in
Brownlow had appeared to favour. Instead the court took the view that
'prosecuting counsel for centuries have had the right to ask that a mem-
ber of the Panel should stand by for the Crown and to show cause why
someone should not serve on a jury' 39
The Juries Act does not alter this. Where the right of stand by is exer-
cised, the court thought that cause does not have to be shown until and
unless the panel is exhausted.
The court justified this right with a rather unlikely example invol-
ving the trial of a poacher for unlawfully wounding a gamekeeper. The
court stated that someone with poaching convictions in the same area
would be unsuited for jury service although not disqualified. The
strength of this argument to justify the crown's use of the right to stand
by is negligible. As counsel for the applicant pointed out, in such a case
there would be reasonable grounds for thinking that there might be
bias and therefore the crown could show cause to challenge the juror.
The further justification ofjury vetting the court used is the need to
prevent crime. It is a criminal offence to serve on a jury while dis-
qualified. Therefore the police are doing no more than their normal
duty of crime prevention in scrutinising jury panels.
'In the course of looking at criminal records convictions are likely to be
revealed which do not amount to disqualifications. We can see no
reason why information about such convictions should not be passed
on to prosecuting counsel.'"
39. Op. cit. p. 622.
40. Op. cit. p. 625.
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Nevertheless there is an illogical step in the above argument. It may
well be that it is permissible for the police to check that there is no 'dis-
qualified' person on the panel, who would be committing an offence
under the Juries Act 1974 were he to sit. But, if someone is not dis-
qualified under the Act, what reason is there for taking further action?
How can the need to prevent disqualified jurors sittingjustify the pass-
ing of information about qualified people by the police to prosecuting
counsel?
If information about past convictions can be passed, what other
information might there be 'no reason' not to pass? When one considers
the type of information that seems to find its way on to police compu-
ters generally, and in particular the information disclosed to the
defence in the anarchists trial, the problem is obvious.
The court was aware of the problem ofjurors' privacy and thought
that any information should be circulated to as few people as possible.
Consequently it felt that the prosecution had no obligation to pass any
information on to the defence!
The final factor which persuaded the court that jury vetting was per-
missible was legal precedent. After discussing the historical develop-
ment of the Crown's right to ask ajuror to stand by and the thesis that
this right can be exercised without there being 'a provable valid objec-
tion', the court elected to follow the 19th-century case of Mansell v R 4 .
In Mansell it was held there was no need to show cause until the panel
was exhausted.
Throughout, the court equate the use ofjury vetting with the tradi-
tional devices for qualifying random selection. These include chal-
lenges for cause, the peremptory challenge, the judge's intervention if
the potential juror cannot read the words when taking the oath or hear
what is being said, or the situation where the potential juror is ill or
insane. The court ignores the fact thatjury vetting, followed by the use
of the right to stand by jurors with no need to show cause until the
panel is exhausted, in effect, gives the Crown an almost unlimited num-
ber of peremptory challenges. This is obviously unfair. Indeed the
unrestricted use of the peremptory challenge by the Crown was out-
lawed in 1305 by statute42 and this was superceded by similar legisla-
tion in 182541. The Crown revived this right 'by the back door' using
the stand by instead of the challenge. This practice was accepted in
Mansell on the basis of a somewhat controversial interpretation of these
statutes. The court in Mason had an opportunity to reconsider this area
of law but did not grasp it.
Nowhere does the court discuss the ramifications of this practice, for
example, the effect on the notion of a randomly selected jury, or the
danger of a public belief in packed juries. Unlike the court in Brownlow
the judges do not appear to be aware of the wider issues, nor are they
41. (1857) 8 E & B 54. For a full discussion of the history of the Crown's right of stand
by see J. McEldowney 'Stand by for the Crown - An Historical Analysis' (1979) Crim
LR pp. 272-283.
42. 33 Edw I Stat 4.
43. Juries Act, s. 29.
Jury vetting 171
worried by the possibility that the practice might spread. The court
states that the Attorney General's guidelines to restrict vetting do not
have the force of law, yet no concern is expressed about the consequent
impossibility of enforcement .
The court appears to be perfectly happy to leave the exercise of the
Crown's right to stand by in the hands of the prosecution, with no
supervision. 'We would expect them to act responsibly and not to
request a stand by unnecessarily'4 . Yet how can we expect the prose-
cution to exercise this power in a neutral fashion? It is not fair to them
or the accused. It is certainly not wise. In view of the type of informa-
tion the prosecution may acquire, beyond a list of criminal convictions,
it seems most unsatisfactory to subject them to this conflict of interests.
Thus the court focussed its attention on the 'practical' arguments
againstjury vetting, and found them without merit. It never really con-
sidered the 'ideological' arguments.
The state and the jury - conclusion
The state long ago tried to control or, at least, influence the decision of
the jury, using methods like unlimited challenges, jailingjurors for ver-
dicts of acquittal, 'packing' juries etc . It has frequently tried to retain
the legitimising effect the jury has on the criminal justice system while
denying it true efficacy.
Since accusations of 'picking' juries 150 years ago the state has not
made any real attempt to control the activity of the jury until recently.
Indeed recent reforms have been in line with the traditional ideals of
the jury and have served to strengthen it as an institution.
The debate which preceded the enactment of the majority verdict
found common ground in the desire for an independent jury. The
opposing camps differed simply on the best way of achieving this. The
argument that carried the day was that by dispensing with the unani-
mous verdict the power of the corrupt or perverse juror would be neut-
ralised.
'We want this clause in the Bill for two reasons. First by far the most
important, to check the abuse of the jury system by the intimidation or
corruption ofjurors, or attempts to corrupt them. Secondly and admit-
tedly far less important but still important, to reduce the frustration
and waste which is caused when a jury is prevented from reaching
agreement by the perversity of one or two jurors.'47
It is interesting to note that two separate arguments are advanced.
In ideological terms arguments for change based on the need to safe-
guard the jury's independence are much more attractive than those
based on reducing waste and frustration by make the jury more effi-
44. Mason, at 626.
45. Ibid. at 625.
46. For a full account see Cornish op. cit.
47. Lord Stonham, Joint Parliamentary Undersecretary of State for the Home Office.
Parliamentary Debates (HL), Vol 283 p. 330.
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cient. The latter arguments might appear merely expedient in placing
'efficiency' before 'justice'.
Certainly the other recent reform, that of the franchise in 1972, was
carried out in order that thejury could still be seen to be representative of
the community and thus impartial and independent. This change
strengthened the jury's legitimacy as we have already mentioned.
Jury vetting is a slightly different matter. The difficulty lies in seeing
how the legitimacy of the practice can be based on the need to protect the
traditionaljury ideals. Proponents of vetting attempt tojustify it in this
way. Yet they fail in their arguments, as we have tried to demonstrate.
Why then is the state trying to control or influence thejury once more?
Why, at this time, does it wish to weed out what it perceives to be the
'biased' or 'partial' juror? Why is there a new pressure to obtain more
compliant juries?
The broadening of thejury franchise has undoubtedly had an effect in
encouraging vetting. The averagejuror is no longer 'middle aged, middle
class and middle minded' to use Lord Devlin's description 8. He is there-
fore less likely automatically to be on the side of authority, less likely to
uphold an oppressive law, less likely to agree with the state, less likely
to accept the evidence of the police where there is a dispute, more likely to
sympathise with, or, at least, understand the experiences ofthe defendant,
and, therefore, one would guess, less likely to convict. The introduction of
the majority verdict, shortly before the extension of the franchise, no
doubt helped to mitigate these effects. One wonders if abandoning the
requirement of unanimity was encouraged by the impending disposal of
the property qualification.
Jury vetting is perhaps another attempt to lessen the impact of a truly
representativejury. Having been forced to abolish the property qualifica-
tion to maintain thejury's legitimacy, the state is then trying to exclude, in
an underhand way, those whom it considers undesirable. Most would not
have been eligible for service before the reform. True representativeness is
seen to be dangerous. The state wants 'middle minded'jurors. In other
words the state is trying to have its cake- increased legitimacy- and eat it
- by excluding those it does not want.
Another pressure to vet is that the state is increasingly developing a crimi-
naljustice system operated by technicians and administered by profession-
als. Efficiency, cost and expedition are their concerns. Certain agencies
within the system have responded enthusiastically to this development. The
police, for example, have emphasised their expertise and exerted their grow-
ing power in pushing for 'modernisation' of the criminal justice system.
The attacks by the police (led by Sir Robert Mark) against thejury's
control over the trial verdict are a prime example of this trend49 . The
jury is seen by the police and others as an impediment to greater effi-
ciency in the 'crime control' model of justice ° . The right to jury trial
48. P. Devlin op. cit. p. 20.
49. See e.g. Mark R., The 1973 Dimbleby Lecture (BBC Publication, London, 1973).
50. See H. Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford University Press, Stand-
ford, 1968). Packer contrasts the 'crime control' model ofjustice with the 'due process'
model.
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has recently been curtailed by limiting the type of offence for which it
can be demanded51 . The obstacle the jury presents to the processing of
people through the criminal justice system is further lessened by vet-
ting the jurors. After all the police and prosecutors do not bring people
to court unless they are almost certainly guilty 2. There have been
many complaints about the high acquittal rate in jury trials.
In reality those who support vetting appear to do so on the basis that
through it the jury can be improved in terms of efficiency, predictabil-
ity and compatibility with the state's notion ofjustice. Independence is
not really seen as a virtue by the state. It is thought that the jury should
be slotted more comfortably into the modem system ofjustice adminis-
tration and in return the jury can function more efficiently if it is cogni-
zant of the aims and purposes of the administrative system as a whole 3.
A 'wayward' jury can only disrupt the smooth running exercise of the
state's responsibility to punish the wrongdoer. Now that the technology
exists to scrutinise jurors, it is bound to be used. Nevertheless the state
must be careful. The jury cannot continue to retain its legitimacy
indefinitely if it is abused by the state. That is why jury 'packing' and
the device of 'special' juries had to stop. It is the jury's independence,
and its waywardness, when it holds firm against the all persuasive
forces of the law and the state, which generate the jury's popularity and
the faith which the public have in it.
51. Criminal Law Act 1977.
52. See H. Packer op. cit.,J. SkolnickJustice Without Trial (Wiley, New York, 1966).
53. See E. Thomson op. cit.
